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Abstract 
Trained as a scientist and empirical psychologist, Robert Musil offers an illuminating instance of a post-
Nietzschean modernist writer whose endeavor was to develop an experimental literary language that 
would more adequately represent experience as psychology and philosophy were coming to understand 
it. Musil's enterprise, based on regarding literature as experience rather than as a formal construct of 
language only, is not best examined by structurally-based language or discourse analysis and criticism. 
Like Mach and William James coming along at the end of the idealistic tradition in European thought, 
Musil wanted to fashion a language that would permit objective communication of the whole complex 
flow of experience from person to person and within society as a whole, and thus make true 
communication possible. Musil's fiction grew out of the phenomenological enterprise, but the focus here 
is on his interest in shaping this philosophical mode of thinking into a precise fictional vehicle—an 
approach often overlooked in comparing the practice of writers' and philosophers' ideas. 
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Robert Musil: Literature as Experience 
Burton Pike 
CUNY Graduate School 
Robert Musil was a trained scientist with a formidable intellect, an 
expert in behavioral psychology, mathematics, and engineering who was 
also widely and deeply read in philosophy.' Science and philosophy were 
the quarters from which, with Nietzschean fervor and intent, he ap- 
proached his mission as a writer. He was impelled by the desire to create 
through imaginative writing, by experimental means, anew morality that 
would reflect the new world brought about by the discoveries of the 
physical and human sciences, a morality that would replace the tattered 
set of outmoded ethics whose hollowness Nietzsche and the industrial, 
scientific, and technological revolutions ofthe nineteenth century had so 
pitilessly exposed. He unremittingly worked toward the goal of achieving 
in his writing anew synthesis of spiritual and moral values with the utmost 
scientific precision. 
One major strand of Musil's enterprise was his attitude toward 
experience and language as it developed out of his early training in the 
discipline of behavioral psychology and philosophy associated with 
William James, Husserl, and Mach, thinkers who were attempting to 
synthesize empirical scientific progress and cultural values. This theme 
is particularly interesting in light of our century's enduring obsession 
with language and its role in constituting or mediating or inhibiting our 
experience of the world. 
Too often in discussing the complex web of ideas behind a writer's 
work we forage in the work for the ideas, without pausing to think that the 
processes of fiction are radically different from those of intellectual 
discourse, and that the two cannot be equated. What makes Musil so 
interesting is that he had the scientific training and ability to engage 
thoroughly in intellectual discourse, but spent his life trying to reinvent 
this discourse in prose fiction, creating a new kind of literature in the 
process. 1
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In this century philosophy and literary criticism and theory have 
followed two general orientations. One gives priority to language as 
mediating our knowledge of the world, the other subordinates language 
to sensory and perceptual experience, which language serves to mediate. 
The first view holds that language precedes experience "logically, 
ontologically, and genetically, and modifies and distorts experience." 
The second gives priority to "the logical and ontological primacy of 
experience over language" (Koestenbaum xii). These orientations are by 
no means mutually exclusive, but serve to indicate a primary emphasis 
on one or the other aspect. The orientation favoring language describes 
a general line from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Mauthner, Saussure, and 
He idegger through structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction; 
the second, originating in the philosophy of Husserl, reaches generally 
through phenomenology to existentialism and to the group of 
phenomenologist critics Sarah Lawall has called "the critics of con- 
sciousness." 
The approach based on the primacy of language over experience 
assumes, as one commentator has put it, "that at least some, and perhaps 
all philosophical problems are the logical consequences of quasi-gram- 
matical errors or ambiguities in the use of language." Husserl, on the 
other hand, "assumes that language reflects the structure of experience, 
or, if it does not, that we can examine experience independently of 
language" (Koestenbaum xii). Today this latter notion, which disregards 
language as the vehicle through which experience is rendered, seems 
naive. But for the purpose of my argument, I would like to maintain a 
distinction between the emphasis on language and the emphasis on 
experience, even while recognizing that it is not absolute. ("Experience" 
is taken here to refer to perceptual and sensory experience and its 
cognitive effects.) 
My general argument is that writers of the early modernist genera- 
tion, and certainly Musil, were not blocked by language's presumed 
inability to represent experience, but on the contrary were struggling to 
develop a new kind of literary language that would adequately represent 
experience as a cognitive process as it was then coming to be understood. 
Musil's extraordinary enterprise, in particular, does not seem amenable 
to structuralist or post-structuralist theoretical generalizations. He was a 
writer of fiction who was attempting to forge with the greatest possible 
precision a language of images that would portray the inexact process by 
which a character proceeds through life within the envelope of his 
individual perceptions, sensations, thoughts, and experiences. In The 
Man without Qualities Musil pushed this further, attempting to reconcile 
this process of individual perception with the utopian goal of a world in 2




which social institutions would be morally and ethically revitalized. The 
work of art was to point the way to this revitalization. 
Musil' s was an experiment at once literary, scientific, and moral, and 
the language of fiction was for him the means to craft the revaluation and 
reintegration of values that Nietzsche and Mach had called for. He was 
not interested in discovering the relation of mind to world from an 
abstract point of view, but in experimentally integrating mind and world 
through the images and situations of the surrogate reality of fiction. 
Where, aside from Nietzsche and Mach, was Musil coming from? 
His teachers and those who influenced him when he was young, the pre- 
and early phenomenologists Brentano, Mach, Stumpf, Husserl, and 
William James, were engaged in trying to counter the Newtonian and 
Cartesian reduction of the world to impersonal elements and mechanical 
processes, as expressed in the mid-nineteenth century by means of the 
reigning scientific paradigm of positivism. Positivism admitted as evi- 
dence only those things that could be measured and quantified; Dickens 
grotesquely caricatured it in the figure of Mr. Gradgrind in Hard Times. 
The direction the early phenomenologists took was the result of new 
insights into cognition and an ardent desire to unify human understanding 
on the basis furnished by idealistic philosophy. Their basic criticism was 
directed at what seemed to them a too narrow notion of science.' They 
were not out to reject positivism, but rather sought to broaden this then 
prevailing scientific paradigm by including among its empirical concepts 
a fluid continuum of reason plus sensation and feelings and not simply 
discrete measurable data alone, as constituting the totality of data on 
which scientific hypotheses should be based. As Alfred North Whitehead 
put it in 1925, "The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of 
abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature ofthe case, you 
have abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded 
things are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not 
fitted to deal with them" (Whitehead 59).3 
Musil offers the interesting case of a writer trained as a scientist for 
whom literature operates primarily on the basis of empirical perception 
and sensory experience and for whom language serves as the vehicle to 
represent experience. This argument implicitly rejects the idea that what 
literature conveys is graspable only through an analytic procedure that 
reduces it to rational or rationalized elements of language such as 
narrative and discourse. A writer, even an analytic writer like Musil, 
might be interested in pursuing other goals: in his case, as Philip Payne 
notes, this includes the winning back of the ground of the subject. This 
ground "has been lost," Payne says, "in the field of ideas, to the march of 
a militant objectivity which is both superficial and insensitive; it has been 3
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lost in the field of morals with the sense that principles are written on 
tablets of stone rather than in the human heart; it has been lost in the field 
of science with the disappearance of the observer from the scope of what 
he observes" (Payne 210-11). It might also be said ofmodernist literature 
generally that it resists the attempts of theory to reduce literary expression 
to the problem of language alone. This kind of literature uses language 
to project images that incorporate action in an envelope of sensory 
experience rather than using it descriptively or discursively. The senses, 
emotions, affects, moods, and subliminal effects involved in perception 
and experience are considered essential. It is too reductive, as some 
critics would have it, to consider literary language as merely a doomed 
attempt at some kind of rational discourse that eludes both writer and 
reader, a fruitless butting one's head against the walls of the "prison- 
house of language." 
The anchoring of modernist literature in perceptual and sensory 
images possibly illustrates what Wittgenstein meant when he wrote in the 
Philosophical Investigations that "a picture held us captive. And we 
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed 
to repeat it to us inexorably" (Wittgenstein 48, ¶ 115). Suzanne Langer 
expressed something similar when she said that the artist's way of 
knowing feelings and emotions "is not expressible in ordinary discourse 
[because] ... the forms of feeling and the forms of discursive expression 
are logically incommensurate, so that any exact concepts of feeling and 
emotion cannot be projected into the logical form of literal language" 
(Langer 91).4 
As a series of cognitive images, this kind of literature is primarily 
based on and appeals to an expanded notion of experience, using 
language as its vehicle. The writer seeks to engage the reader in the 
experience by creating verbal images that attempt to re-evoke the 
perceptual and sensory aura of the experience for the reader. Writers as 
ambitious as Proust or Musil will further seek ways to raise experience, 
understood in this fashion, to the level of the generally representative, so 
that it might serve a socially representative function as well-become 
cultural experience, as it were. The overwhelming focus of literary theory 
on language as discourse in recent times has not been very helpful in 
comprehending this notion. Language-based critics or theorists generally 
operate by positing or assuming language as the exclusive field of 
operations and then excerpting linguistic micro-features such as meta- 
phors, metonyms, or discourses from a work and analyzing them nar- 
rowly within a structural, quasi-philosophical, political, ideological, or 
sociological context, without paying particular attention to other aspects 
or to the work as a whole. 4




All this is perhaps simply another way of maintaining that literature 
as an art is essentially empirical and descriptive rather than abstract and 
analytical: Flannery O'Connor called art a virtue ofthe practical intellect. 
Broadly speaking, the phenomenological perspective offers a foundation 
for the premise that modernist literature, using language as its vehicle, 
functions primarily as a mediator of experience as perceived by an 
experiencing consciousness. My thesis is that when writers call upon 
philosophers, they do so not to grasp and argue the philosophical system, 
but to define an experimental and necessarily ad hoc field for their own 
fictional representations. So although Musil's thought was largely formed 
by a specifically phenomenological environment, his many quarrels with 
phenomenological theory are marks of the questing and questioning 
writer rather than the concerns of a developing psychologist or philoso- 
pher. It is therefore not my purpose to summarize or criticize Husserl's 
philosophy; Musil did both in some detail in his Tagebucher (Diaries). 
My focus is rather on how Musil's way of projecting the world in 
literature, strongly formed by phenomenological ideas, provided a base 
and framework for his experimental writing. 
This said, Musil's connection with the early phenomenologists was 
a direct one: he was thoroughly grounded in empirical phenomenology 
as well as empirical science. Carl Stumpf, to whom Husserl dedicated the 
Logical Investigations, was Musil's Doktorvater in Berlin; he wrote his 
controversial doctoral dissertation on Ernst Mach under Stumpf s direc- 
tion (Toward an Evaluation of Mach's Theories, 1908). Musil's goal as 
a writer of uniting precision with soul, as he put it in the Man without 
Qualities, arose out of this background. 
For the writer as well as for phenomenology and empirical science, 
"precision" was a tough problem. In Husserl's view, in one critic's words, 
"there is no absolute criterion of precision. Precision is a function of 
context and subject-matter. . . . [In order] to accept Husserl's analyses 
we must grant that vague experiences are legitimate objects of philo- 
sophic scrutiny. We cannot restrict our efforts to the simple, the clear, and 
the distinct. . . . [What is to be analyzed] consists of obscure, fuzzy, and 
cloudy clusters of experience. . . . The fact that the experiences analyzed 
are often vague does not diminish their certainty" (Koestenbaum xiii). 
Scientific rationality and precision-still upheld as a primary value, but 
enlarged-is therefore to be seen as a variable that is a function of 
different contexts rather than a categorical summation of fixed points. 
Musil's self-imposed task as a writer was to find a literary language able 
to render with precision these "obscure, fuzzy, and cloudy clusters of 
experience." 5
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Musil was born in 1880, the year Husserl turned twenty-one. This 
was the year in which Zola, in the conclusion to his essay "Le Roman 
experimental," called for a new kind ofnove I, one that would embody the 
unfolding discoveries of empirical science about the workings of mind 
and body in relation to the world. This new empirical method would 
replace the traditional conventions that reach back to classical drama and 
rhetoric with a new, experimental method, the triumph of which, Zola 
wrote, "is an inevitable evolution. Literature . . ," Zola goes on to say, 
"does not depend merely upon the author; it is influenced by the nature 
it depicts and by the man whom it studies. Now ifthe savants change their 
ideas of nature, if they find the true mechanism of life, they force us to 
follow them, to precede them even, so as to play our role in the new 
hypotheses. The metaphysical man is dead; our whole territory is 
transformed by the advent of the physiological man. No doubt," Zola 
continues, " 'Achilles' anger," Dido's love,' will last forever on account 
of their beauty; but today we feel the necessity of analyzing anger and 
love, of discovering exactly how such passions work in the human being 
. . . : we have become experimentalists instead of philosophers" (Zola 
598-99).5 
As a novelist and a firm believer in positivism, Zola tried to follow 
this program by combining affect and intellect in his construction of 
character and in his passages of narrative description. Zola's successors, 
although less confident about positivism than he was, attempted to 
fashion images in a new way that would reflect the complexities of 
cognition as it was then coming to be understood, and-still "scientific" 
in the experimental sense-would use art to expand knowledge. (The 
example of Zola figures in Musil's diaries.) This new way of fashioning 
literary images, founded on a more inclusive concept of precise science 
than the mere gathering ofdata, would make serious fiction itselfa branch 
of knowledge, giving it a social, "scientific" function. Art as knowledge 
(Erkenntnis), as projected by Nietzsche and his literary followers (Musil, 
Kafka, Rilke, and Thomas Mann, among others), would be both scientific 
and moral and could serve as a principal means of restoring unity (but a 
new kind of unity, not an old one) to the rapidly fragmenting values of 
Western culture. (Here we see the considerable influence of Mach, whose 
vision is inscribed in the works of many of these writers.) 
By the turn of the twentieth century positivism was fading as the 
leading paradigm of basic scientific thinking. Rather than attempting to 
uncover a few basic, material laws, scientific thought was turning to less 
rigid notions. It was becoming a process, as John Weiss has noted, of 
"pragmatic, hypothetical analysis, revealing tentative, ifhighly probable, 
generalizations." With the new physics that was developing, the natural 6




sciences "ceased to be the ally and main support of the materialistic 
metaphysics which had seemed unassailable since the eighteen-fifties. If 
matter in motion was not the ultimate reality but merely a useful 
hypothesis for explaining some natural phenomena, one could legiti- 
mately reestablish equality of status for man's values, ideals, and 
emotional responses to his environment" (Weiss 12-13). Karl R. Popper 
put this new footing of scientific investigation succinctly: "I think that we 
shall have to get accustomed to the idea that we must not look upon 
science as a 'body of knowledge,' but rather as a system of hypotheses, 
that is to say, as a system of guesses or anticipations which in principle 
cannot be justified, but with which we work as long as they stand up to 
tests, and of which we are never justified in saying that we know that they 
are 'true' or 'more or less certain' or even 'probable' " (Popper 317, 
quoted in Holton 20). Musil, in the course of a detailed series of notes and 
comments in his diaries in 1904 or 1905 discussing Husserl' s Logical 
Investigations, notes that ". . . there remains only a scale of degrees of 
probability, and it is conceivable that a certain level ofprobability is what 
we call certainty" (Tagebiicher 119; translation mine). Bergson, with his 
emphasis on experience as flux, also contributed to undermining the 
notion of a fixed rhetorical literary language used to depict defined 
characters in defined situations, and William James called his influential 
study The Varieties of Religious Experience.' 
It was this paradigmatic change in the assumptions of scientific 
thought that gave Musil the impetus for his experimental search to 
communicate with precision, through fiction, an expanded notion of 
experience. In a Machian context science and literature could be thought 
of as aspects of a unitary process with different emphases but the same 
goal, the increase of know ledge through a process of rigorous experimen- 
tation: knowledge not for its own sake, but knowledge that would lead to 
a higher and more humane morality while still passing the test of 
experimental rigor. Although outside the scope of this discussion, 
Musil' s overriding purpose was a moral one; his passion and his intellect 
were both fueled by his specifically equating ethics with aesthetics-an 
equation that seems to have had its roots in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, 
and Nietzsche, and which is also found in many other writers around the 
turn of the century.' 
Throughout his fiction Musil stresses both the inadequacy of re- 
ceived metaphysical notions and the inadequacy of traditional rhetoric 
and conventions of narrative literature to explain the world. He put 
hypotheses he derived from the phenomenologists' view of experience 
into the testing crucible of fictional situations. As a writer he was 
concerned with image-making, but he wanted to construct fictional 7
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situations that, in accord with the Husserlian approach, would be conso- 
nant with empirical scientific verification. Art as knowledge in fiction 
could thus become, as Zola had prophesied, part of science, although 
Zola's empiricism had been totally positivistic, while Musil's was more 
thoroughly scientific and experimental. In Musil's view, the chief 
function of language as it is used in literature is to mediate experience as 
projected by the author. These experiences and feelings are not the 
author's own, at least in primal form: there is a distinction between 
autobiography and fiction. They are rather material the writer can work 
with. (Suzanne Langer notes that "every work of art expresses . . . not 
feelings and emotions which the artist has, but feelings and emotions 
which the artist knows; his insight into the nature of sentience, his picture 
of vital experience, physical and emotive and fantastic" [Langer 91]). 
The burden of language as Musil understands it is not to mystify, but 
to analyze and order experience without reducing it. He makes his 
characters, within their immediate fictional situations, attempt to relate 
to each other and the world through their changing perceptual and 
sensory envelopes in terms of the experiences he tries out on them. What 
we can know, according to Husserl, is not the actual physical world but 
only our experience of it. Unlike Husserl, Musil is quite rigorous in 
making this process experimental and in developing a literary language 
that can express it with great precision. He puts all his major characters 
in this same experimental stance. 
This is a tough enterprise for a writer, for not only is representing the 
complexity of experience thus understood a boundless task, but it rejects 
as impossibly artificial (not "true to life") the traditional literary notions 
of plot, dramatic action, and characterization that normally provide a 
guiding structure for readers as well as writers. The results are contradic- 
tory and paradoxical: self and world, as Musil treats them, dissolve into 
a flow of endless "possibilities," of the kind so lovingly developed in The 
Man without Qualities.' The only way to temporarily arrest this flow, 
Musil postulates, is for an individual to attain an attenuated, tentative, 
ineffable, and quite transitory mystical state that he calls the "other 
condition," an ecstatic state of heightened awareness similar to that 
advocated by Walter Pater.9 
The problem with regarding thoughts and sensations as a stream or 
flow with intermittent stases is, to quote William James, "introspectively, 
to see the transitive parts for what they really are. If they are but flights 
to conclusions, stopping them to look at them before a conclusion is 
reached is really annihilating them. . . . Let anyone try to cut a thought 
across the middle and get a look at its section, and he will see how difficult 
the introspective observation ofthe transitive tract is.... Or ifour purpose 8




is nimble enough and we do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be itself. . . . 
The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like ... trying 
to turn up the light quickly enough to see how the darkness looks" (quoted 
in Holton 124). 
Musil, who was quite familiar with James's work, understood this 
dilemma very well: throughout his diaries, essays, and interviews he 
worries endlessly about the technical problems this posed for him as a 
writer. Rejecting narrative in the traditional sense, he relies on a narrator 
external to the action to frame and control the experimental process as it 
unfolds. But since each scene is limited to representing the envelope of 
perceptions, sensations, actions, and experiences of the characters who 
are perceiving, sensing, acting, and experiencing within it, each scene 
tends to become a hermetic unit and mise-en-abyme. No extended 
dramatic narrative (for which characters must be defined as consistent 
types or counters) is possible. Musil's "non-narrative narrative" consists 
of a sequence of quasi-independent micro-narratives, each of which 
could be extended at will in any direction or interspersed with other 
micro-narratives. Like Husserl, Musil believed in building up and 
analyzing all the data that hypothetically constitute experience. He did 
not, like Thomas Mann or Hermann Broch, for example, begin with an 
a priori set of values or literary notions. 
This might explain why Musil had trouble finishing anything, 
notably The Man without Qualities and his essays: the experimental path 
he set up, "the path of the smallest steps" as he called it, that would 
ultimately reconcile the potential of probability with the reality of what 
actually happens, can never end. This is a negative consequence of his 
dedication to a hypothetical approach that gives primacy to "a scale of 
degrees of probability," and that defines certainty as only the closest 
approach to the greatest achievable degree of probability-a kind of 
Zeno's arrow of probability suspended in its flight toward certainty. 
Of course language as well as experience may be looked at as also 
constituting an amalgam of emotions and ideas, especially in the se- 
quences of cognitive images that are a major feature of much modernist 
literature. Something of Musil's sophisticated awareness of this interde- 
pendence-in this respect he is unlike Husserl-can be indicated by an 
argument of Mary Hesse's that is very close to Musil' s conception. Hesse 
claims that meanings are not fixed in relation to universals or types, but 
"grow in dynamic interaction with culture and experience." If the 
meaning of words is thus changeable rather than fixed, the way to get 
beyond individual uses of each word is, Hesse argues, "to replace the 
Aristotelian model of `intuition of the universal,' which goes from 
particulars `up' to the universal and 'down again' to its other realizations, 9
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by a model that goes 'horizontally' from particulars to particulars. 
Members of a class . . . ," she argues, "are loosely grouped by relations 
of similarity and difference into fuzzy, overlapping, and temporarily 
defined classes whose boundaries change with experience and cultural 
convention" (Hesse 38). This last statement is related to Husserl's 
inclusive notion of experience and indicates the principal way that Musil, 
like William James, sees language as mediating the ever-shifting bound- 
aries of perceptual and sensory experience, relying on constantly chang- 
ing contextual determinations of meaning rather than on fixed ones. The 
narrator of The Man without Qualities, for instance, says at one point that 
everything that the central character, Ulrich, and his sister Agathe 
"encountered on the plane of ideas had the tensed, tightrope-walking 
nature of the once-and-never-again, and whenever they talked about it 
they did so in the awareness that no single word could be used twice 
without changing its meaning" (Musil, GW 4: 1400).10 
Pity the poor writer! The conflicts and paradoxes inherent in this 
approach to fiction are set out at the very beginning of The Man without 
Qualities. A scientist and mathematician, Ulrich is unable to fix any 
actual or potential moment in the flow of experience as definitive, or to 
fashion a language that could mediate the flow of experience in any 
reliable fashion, such as empirical science demands. In his very first 
appearance in the novel, Ulrich is standing behind a window in his house 
with a stopwatch in his hand, trying without success to freeze the flow of 
traffic and pedestrians on the street outside in a statistical measurement. 
Representation, and the language that is its vehicle, can only be valid 
in Musil's view if rendered with the utmost precision. The Man without 
Qualities contains a veritable catalog of the ways people talk, write, and 
interact in their lives, and these ways are considered unsatisfactory and 
insufficient. Each social class, profession, and individual in the novel is 
given his/her/its/their own hermetic vocabularies and grammars. Musil 
included mystic, philosophical, and scientific language, as well as the 
everyday conversational idiolects of each of the characters in the novel. 
(Each character speaks in his or her own style, idiom, vocabulary, and 
syntax, crossing but rarely intersecting with the others.") Musil even 
includes body language, as well as the inner, unrealized language of the 
inarticulate and the insane! The problem, as he saw it, lay in somehow 
fashioning a language that would overcome these obstacles and permit 
objective communication of the whole complex flow of experience from 
person to person and within society as a whole, and thus make true 
communication possible. 
I would disagree with Marike Finlay, who sees Musil's oeuvre 
exclusively in terms of discourse, that is, narrative considered solely as 10




a problem of discursive language. Finlay says that The Man without 
Qualities "is the discursive practice which is, par excellence, built up of 
the pragmatic material interaction of infinitely expanding fields of other 
discursive practices." The Man without Qualities, she says, "is not 
narrative; it is a constant narration made up of other narrations, a 
discourse of and with other discourses. Herein lies the major transforma- 
tion that Musil's discursive practice effects on the procedures of the 
classical episteme, thus heralding the opening of the modern episteme" 
(Finlay 133-34). 
It is quite true that the problem of narrative was a central one for 
Musil, but it is misleading to focus on this only as a problem of discourse, 
in the current fashion, as Finlay and others have done. If a writer envisions 
experience as a complex floating membrane of thoughts, feelings, 
memories, and sensations that changes at every moment, and language 
likewise, then conventional techniques of narrative, and even some not 
so conventional, will appear reductive and impossibly simplistic, but 
discursive analysis alone is not capable of encompassing the phenom- 
enon. A recurring image in Musil's fiction is that of puffy white clouds 
continually forming and reforming as the invisible force of the air moves 
them along against the background of a remote, unattainable blue sky. 
These moving clouds are non-narrative and non-discursive, but they 
figure the billowing reality of experience that Musil is trying to encom- 
pass and express. 
In his novella Tonka an impatient young middle-class scientist, 
whose understanding of the world is exclusively scientific and empirical, 
has an affair with a silent, uneducated working-class girl. Tonka, the girl 
in question, has a powerful intuitive understanding of the world, but 
cannot express herself at all through language. He is totally articulate, she 
is totally inarticulate. Musil' s problem was how to present their relation- 
ship as a flow of solipsistically individualized experience. At one point 
they are sitting at the edge of some woods, "and he was simply gazing into 
space though half-shut eyelids, not talking, letting his thoughts roam. 
Tonka began to be afraid she had offended him again. Several times she 
took a deep breath, as if about to speak, but then shyness held her back. 
So for a long time there was no sound but the woodland murmur that is 
so tormenting, rising and sinking away in a different place at every 
instant. Once a brown butterfly fluttered past them and settled on a long- 
stemmed flower, which quivered under the touch, swaying to and fro and 
then quite suddenly being quite still again, like a conversation broken off. 
Tonka pressed her fingers hard into the moss on which they were sitting, 
but after a while the tiny blades stood up again, one after the other, row 
on row, until there was finally no more trace of the hand that had lain 11
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there. It was enough to make one weep, without knowing why. If she had 
been trained to think, like her companion, at that moment Tonka would 
have realized that Nature consists of noth ing but ugly little things that one 
hardly notices and which live as sadly far apart from each other as the stars 
in the night sky. The beauties of Nature. . . . A wasp was crawling over 
his shoe. Its head was like a lantern. He watched it, contemplating his 
shoe, which was sticking up broad and black, oblique against the brown 
of the earth" (Musil, "Tonka" 275 [ellipsis in original]). 
This passage presents the disparate flow of stimulation and response 
in two mismatched lovers in a natural setting. The setting provides an 
external unity-it is the same for both-but the characters' responses to 
it place them in different worlds. The man observes nature strictly as an 
empirical scientist would, noting only objective data and apparently 
decrying feeling-but in doing so he exhibits feelings he refuses to 
acknowledge. Tonka, without his education or ability to articulate her 
thoughts in words, shrinks from nature because of her feelings for the 
man. She is able to feel the world directly but not to conceptualize or 
judge it (hence her experience can only be indirectly pointed at); the man 
conceptualizes and judges the world but cannot feel it, at least directly. 
The setting is a screen on which the characters project what each is 
experiencing but cannot express, and of which, at some level of con- 
sciousness, they are only dimly aware. It is these subliminal feelings that 
shape the experience and that Musil is trying to shape into a story. 
Here, then, Musil is experimenting with how language can be made 
to convey the flow of experience in a way that is inaccessible to the 
conventional languages of literature and science. By his ingenious use of 
language, he draws the reader into re-feeling what the characters are 
feeling. This ability to evoke with great precision in the reader the 
complex web of feelings associated with the situation and thoughts of the 
character is perhaps Musil's greatest achievement as a writer. 
This technique is far more skillfully developed in The Man without 
Qualities. At one point Ulrich and his sister Agathe, who is living with 
him, are "changing to go out for the evening. There was no one in the 
house to help Agathe aside from Ulrich; they had started late and had thus 
been in the greatest haste for a quarter of an hour when a short pause 
intervened. Piece by piece, nearly all the ornaments of war a woman puts 
on for such occasions were strewn on the chairbacks and surfaces of the 
room, and Agathe was in the act of bending over her foot with all the 
concentration called for by the pulling on of a thin silk stocking. Ulrich 
was standing behind her. He saw her head, her neck, her shoulders, and 
this nearly naked back; her body was curved over her raised knees, 
slightly to the side, and the tension of this process sent three folds around 12




her neck, shooting slender and merry through her clear skin like three 
arrows: the charming physicality of this painting, escaped from the 
instantaneously spreading stillness, seemed to have lost its frame, and 
passed so abruptly and directly into Ulrich's body that he left the place 
he was standing and, not so entirely without consciousness as a banner 
being unfurled by the wind, but also not with deliberate reflection, crept 
closer on tiptoe, surprised the bent-over figure, and with gentle ferocity 
bit into one ofthose arrows, while his arm closed tightly around his sister. 
Then Ulrich's teeth just as cautiously released his overpowered victim; 
his right hand had grabbed her knee, and while with his left arm he pressed 
her body to his, he pulled her upright with him on upward-bounding 
tendons. Agathe cried out in fright." 
"Up to this point everything had taken place as playfully and jokingly 
as much that had gone on before, and even if it was tinged with the colors 
of love, it was only with the really shy intention of concealing love's 
unwonted dangerous nature beneath such cheerfully intimate dress. But 
when Agathe got over her fright, and felt herself not so much flying 
though the air as rather resting in it, suddenly liberated from all heaviness 
and directed in its stead by the gentle force of the gradually decelerating 
motion, it brought about one of those accidents which no one has in his 
power, that she seemed to herself in this state strangely soothed, indeed 
carried away from all earthly unrest; with a movement changing the 
balance of her body that she could never have repeated she also brushed 
away the last silken thread of compulsion, turned in falling to her brother, 
continued, so to speak, her rise as she fell, and lay, sinking down, as a 
cloud of happiness in his arms" (Musil, GW 4: 1081-82).12 
Musil's notion that the task of literature is to represent with precision 
the fuzzy wholeness of experience was but one of many analogous 
attempts by modernist writers to try to find new and more accurate forms 
of expression. Even Henry James had written in 1888 that "experience is 
never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense sensibility, a kind 
of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads suspended in the chamber 
of consciousness, and catching every air-borne particle on its tissue. It is 
the very atmosphere of the mind" (H. James 52). 
The problem raised by many modernist writers is one central to 
phenomenological theory: a view of "consciousness" and "experience" 
such as Musil's presupposes a subjective consciousness, that is, an 
individual mind-whether the character's, narrator's, author's, or some 
combination of them-that is doing the perceiving and experiencing. 
What is the nature of the world independently of being perceived, Husserl 
had wondered. This was a question that intensely preoccupied Musil. 
How can a bridge (a utopian, hence idealistic bridge) be built from this 13
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isolated subjective mind to the social, moral, and ethical concerns of 
society at large? Does not this approach to perception and experience, so 
radically centered on the subjective mind, commit a writer to a mode of 
fiction centered on solipsistic characters? (Virginia Woolf s and D. H. 
Lawrence's fiction, Rilke's novel Malte Laurids Brigge, and Joyce's two 
major novels also raise the question.) In much of fiction written in the last 
few decades, on the other hand, characters are frequently counters or 
stereotypes, actors in social situations rather than perceiving 
consciousnesses. Does this "post-modern" fiction rest on or appeal to 
sensation, perception, and experience at all, in the phenomenological or 
modernist sense? 
There would seem to have been in the early phenomenologists and 
in Musil an underlying idealism that has since been lost, a belief that in 
spite of the increasing solipsism and dehumanizing specialization of 
modern life there is some sphere or some level-one hardly knows what 
to call it-in or on which all the conflicting and apparently unrelated 
fragments, self and world, feeling and intellect, science and society, 
skepticism and belief, could somehow be melded into a coherent, ethical 
whole. This might explain why the phenomonological basis is no longer 
fashionable in literary criticism and theory, and why language-based 
criticism, with its entrenched skepticism about idealist assumptions, has 
become dominant-it suits the temper of our time, which is disillusioned 
about any form of larger unity in the world. In the tradition of idealistic 
philosophy, phenomenology conceived experience as the experience of 
an individual person, but underlying the phenomenological enterprise 
was the intention of bringing about moral and ethical reform on the level 
of the larger community, and the belief that this could be done through 
an awakened subjectivity that would somehow expand outwards from the 
individual to the social and cultural world. Our time, however-as Musil 
himself trenchantly observed many times in his essays and in The Man 
without Qualities-has moved instead to a collectivist mode of thinking 
in which political, ideological, ethnic, and tribal thought and behavior 
rather than the individual's subjectivity have become the framework for 
social thought, and in which literary characters, no longer the anchoring 
centers of the world they had been since Romanticism, have become in 
extreme cases cartoon characters. In collectivist fashion the contempo- 
rary human sciences, psychology, medicine, and sociology approach the 
individual only as a statistical manifestation of generalized and ab- 
stracted characteristics. (Thus the disease is more important than the 
patient, who represents for the medical profession only a manifestation 
of it, a "case.") 14




Musil found reason enough to despair of himself and the world 
around him, of which he was a strenuous, acute, and untiring critic; but 
he still believed, as did many of his modernist contemporaries, that there 
was a way forward, if only it could be found, and that a bridge had to be 
built from the individual person equipped with a new and heightened 
awareness to a new society in which ethics would assume a central place. 
This was the matrix of his experimental struggle to forge a language that 
would truly represent and communicate experience. 
Notes 
I. I am indebted to Vincent Crapanzano and to E. J. Baylis Thomas for their 
helpful comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article. A broad 
and invaluable picture of the importance of the psychology of perception in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century European and American culture 
can be found in Judith Ryan, The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and 
Literary Modernism (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991). Ryan is more con- 
cerned with the broader picture of empiricist psychology as a cultural 
phenomenon at the turn of the century. She focusses on Musil more narrowly 
in relation to empirical thought, whereas my focus is on the problems that arise 
at the experimental boundary between theory and fictional technique, as Musil 
tried to construct a world-view in his fiction that was inspired but not 
explained by empiricist philosophy. Another, much broader, contextualization 
of the cultural phenomenon is in Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden 
Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1992 <1990>). Also valuable 
but more technical is Hartmut Cellbrot, Die Bewegung des Sinnes: Zur 
Phanomenologie Robert Musils im Hinblick auf Edmund Husserl, Musil- 
Studien Bd. 17 (Munich: Fink, 1988). See, too, Karl Menges, "Robert Musil 
and Edmund Husserl: Ober phanomenlogische Stukturen im Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften," Modern Austrian Literature 9.3-4 (1976): 131-54. 
2. "The incapacity and unwillingness of science to face problems of value and 
meaning because of its confinement to mere positive facts seems to [Husserl] 
to be at the very root of the crisis of science and of mankind itself. In contrast 
to the science of the Renaissance, which had been part of a comprehensive 
philosophical scheme, a positivist science of mere facts appeared as a 
truncated science endangering man, and in fact endangering itself, by a 
`decapitation.' " Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A 
Historical Introduction, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) 1: 80. 
3. William James had voiced a similar thought in The Principles of Psychol- 
ogy: "Science . . . must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not the 
only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, 
and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on 15
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which she has no claims at all." (Authorized Edition in Two Volumes. New 
York: Dover, 1950 <1890>) 2: 576. 
4. To discuss the central importance of the emotions in relation to perception 
and sensation for Musil and the phenomenologists is beyond the scope of this 
paper. There is a good exposition in Cellbrot, and in the chapter in the Nachlafi 
of The Man without Qualities titled "Agathe stoBt zu ihrem MiBvergnijgen auf 
einen geschichtlichen Abril3 der Gefuhlspsychologie" (GW 4: 1138-46). See 
also William James, Principles of Psychology, chapter 2, "The Emotions," 
and Heydebrand 117-33. 
5. Musil offers a short but penetrating analysis of Zola's essay in a 1927 tribute 
on the sixtieth birthday of the critic Alfred Kerr. Musil notes that while Zola 
had misapprehended the nature of science he had framed the problem 
correctly, "for literature can not be spared having to conform to the scientific 
depiction of the world, and a great part of contemporary literature's lack of 
objective referentiality [Gegenstandslosigkeit] comes about because it has 
been behind the times." (GW 8: 1183. Translation mine). 
6. For Musil's relation to Bergson see Heydebrand 213-16. 
7. See also Musil's Tagebucher and Thomas Mann's essay, "Nietzsche's 
Philosophy in the Light of Our Experience." 
8. "In Ideas ¶ 47 [Husserl] talks of possible worlds. His notion of possible 
worlds is very heavily constrained, however. Since for him the world is not the 
world transcendent of us, not the actual physical world, that is, but only our 
experience of it, what is possible for Husserl means what is experienceable. 
And experienceability, he says, 'never betokens any empty logical possibility, 
but one that has its motive in the system of experience.' " Samuel R. Levin, 
Metaphoric Worlds: Conceptions of a Romantic Nature (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1988) 59. 
9. See Ryan, chapter 2. There is a mention of Pater in Musil's diaries. 
10. Translation mine (copyright Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.). 
11. Language as Babel is used in a similar way in Hofmannsthal's 1921 play 
Der Schwierige. Walter Moser has treated this topic in Musil in an excellent 
article, "La Mise a l'essai des discours dans L ' Homme sans qualites de Robert 
Musil," Canadian Review of Comparative Literature 12.1 (1985): 12-45. 
12. Translation mine (copyright Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.). 
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